Appellate Practice -- Reported Decisions
Sanford F. Young and his firm have handled over 350 appeals in various appellate courts, including the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest court), The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, the various Appellate Divisions, and various other appellate tribunals, such as the Appellate Terms of the City of New York, the Board of Standards and Appeals and the New York Division of Housing and Community Renewal [DHCR].
Sanford F. Young and his firm have handled numerous appellate motions, with a concentration on substantive motions, including seeking permission/leave to appeal to higher courts such as the New York Court of Appeals, and stays pending appeal. Mr. Young authored an authoritative cover article on how to obtain permission/leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals for the New York State Bar Journal.
The firm is proud of its recognition and successes, which are illustrated by many reported cases. Among those are:
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Medical Malpractice
Dickstein v. Dogali, 303 App.Div.2d 443, 757 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2nd Dept.) [medical malpractice; dismissal of defendant hospital reversed]
Plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action against a neurosurgeon and hospital following surgery to control seizures. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment based on its claim that it was not responsible for the surgeon’s errors. On appeal, Sanford F. Young, P.C. persuaded the Appellate Division to reverse and reinstate the action against the hospital.
Hawkins v. Brooklyn-Caledonia Hospital, 239 App.Div.2d 549, 658 N.Y.S.2d 375 (2nd Dept.) [medical malpractice; foreign object; application of res ipsa loquitur]
Plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action for injuries sustained when the tip of a subclavian catheter broke off as defendant’s resident was attempting to insert the catheter in plaintiff’s neck. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to defend defendant’s appeal from the verdict in favor of plaintiff. Affirming, the Appellate Division held that the evidence established that the catheter tip would not have sheared off without negligence, that the catheter was in defendant’s resident’s control, and that plaintiff, who was allegedly noncompliant, did not contribute to the event. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the charge on res ipsa loquitur was proper, and that the evidence established that defendant departed from good and accepted medical procedure.
Flowers v. Southampton Hospital, 215 App.Div.2d 723, 627 N.Y.S.2d 81 (2nd Dept. 1995) [medical malpractice; verdict for plaintiff affirmed]
Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained on behalf of plaintiff to defend defendant physician’s appeal from a jury verdict finding that he was negligent in failing to timely diagnose plaintiff’s breast cancer. Plaintiff claimed that, as a result of defendant’s malpractice, she was required to undergo a modified radical mastectomy rather than a lumpectomy. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant departed from good and accepted medical practice in failing to properly read plaintiff’s mammogram.
Watson v. City of New York, 273 App.Div.2d 115, 709 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1st Dept.) [medical malpractice; continuous treatment doctrine; notice of claim]
In this medical malpractice action, Sanford F. Young, P.C. successfully appealed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint based on his failure to timely file a notice of claim. Reversing, the Appellate Division held that despite plaintiff’s failure to appear for scheduled clinic appointments, the continuous treatment doctrine applied.
Pechko v. Comprehensive Breast Care, 280 App.Div.2d 655, 721 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2nd Dept.) [medical malpractice; timeliness]
In this medical malpractice action for defendants’ failure to diagnose plaintiff’s breast cancer, the trial court granted one physician’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of plaintiff’s failure to properly and timely serve the summons and complaint within the statute of limitations. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to handle plaintiff’s appeal. Reversing, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff properly effectuated service on defendant pursuant to CPLR §308(2).
Jacobson v. County of Westchester, 228 App.Div.2d 480, 643 N.Y.S.2d 676 (2nd Dept.) [medical malpractice; discovery]
In this appeal in a medical malpractice action, Sanford F. Young, P.C. convinced the Appellate Division to reverse that portion of the trial court’s order which declined to direct one physician to appear at a further deposition.
Eden v. Leone, 280 App.Div.2d 578, 720 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2nd Dept.)
In a medical malpractice action, Sanford F. Young, P.C. successfully defended against defendant physicians’ appeal from an order denying their motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s delay in responding to defendants’ 90-day notice. The Appellate Division held that plaintiffs demonstrated a justifiable excuse for the delay and a meritorious claim.
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Products Liability
Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co, Inc., 736 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.) [product liability; liability for foreseeable changes; duty to guard and duty to warn]
Plaintiff was injured when the power press he was operating unexpectedly recycled, causing the loss of three fingers. He commenced a products liability action against the manufacturer of the press, alleging that the machine should have been equipped with a guard and other safety mechanisms and for a failure to warn. The District Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the fact that the control mechanisms were altered. Mr. Young was retained and was successful on appeal. Reversing, the United States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit held, in a landmark decision, that because the alterations were foreseeable, defendant had a duty to protect and warn of dangers due to the unexpected recycling of the press. Jiminez has been cited in hundreds of decisions and briefs.
Forde v. Columbus McKinnon Corporation, 274 App.Div.2d 446, 711 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2nd Dept.) [product liability; duty to comply with OSHA standards under general service contract]
Plaintiff, an employee of Con Edison, was injured when the hoist lift which he was using to move heavy machinery disengaged and fell on him. The accident was caused by a defective hook and the absence of a required safety latch. Defendant Markey Industrial Supply, Inc., which had contracted with plaintiff’s employer to service, inspect and repair the hoists, moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it never assumed a duty to inspect every one of the hundreds of hoists used by Con Ed. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to defend Markey’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment. Affirming, the Appellate Division held, as a matter of law, that Markey had an affirmative duty to inspect and to ensure compliance with OSHA standards. The case then settled for $900,000.
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Personal Injury/Wrongful Death
Kemelman v. Delta Air Line, Inc., 293 App.Div.2d 576, 740 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2nd Dept.) [Warsaw Convention; wrongful death, negligence and wilfulness in dealing with in-flight medical emergency]
This was a wrongful death action against Delta by the family of an airline passenger who sustained a heart attack while aboard an international flight. The estate claimed that the lack of proper medical and emergency care and equipment -- i.e., failure to make an emergency landing, failure to locate a physician on board, and failure to provide a working oxygen canister -- caused plaintiff’s decedent’s death. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to appeal the trial court’s dismissal of the case when it granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the action, holding that the definition of “accident” set forth in the Warsaw Convention included defendant’s employees’ failure to follow procedures in a reasonable manner. The Appellate Division also held that there were issues of fact as to whether defendant’s employees’ actions constituted “wilful misconduct” so that the damages would not be subject to the $75,000 limitation of liability provision of the Warsaw Convention.
Coku v. Millar Elevator Industries, Inc., 2004 WL 2452843 (2nd Dept.) [personal injury; res ipsa loquitur]
Plaintiff, a hotel maintenance worker, was injured when the service elevator suddenly dropped and came to an abrupt stop, causing him to fall from a step ladder he was using to change a light bulb. He sued defendant, which was employed under an elevator service contract, claiming it did not properly maintain and repair the elevator. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to handle plaintiff’s appeal from a verdict for defendant. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where plaintiff had established that the event would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, that defendant had exclusive control of the mechanism and the tachometer bands, and plaintiff did not contribute to the elevator malfunction.
Siragusa v. City of New York, 283 App.Div.2d 294, 727 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; new trial on damages]
The jury awarded plaintiff damages of only $18,500 for her cervical disc injury sustained in a trip and fall in a crosswalk maintained by a public entity. On appeal, Sanford F. Young, P.C. was successful in convincing the Appellate Division that the portion of the verdict that granted her no damages for future pain and suffering was inadequate and against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division thus set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial on damages. Thereafter, the case settled out of court for $250,000.
Elias v. Linder, 4 App.Div.3d 136, 771 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1st Dept.)
Plaintiff sustained lumbar and cervical disc injuries in a hit-in-rear accident. Sanford F. Young, P.C. successfully appealed the jury’s inadequate award of damages of $60,000 and won a new trial on damages for plaintiff’s future pain and suffering.
Delarosa v. NYCTA (1st Dept.)
A young child, whose foot was caught under the comb plate of a subway escalator, suffered a crushing and degloving injury requiring multiple surgeries. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to appeal from the jury’s verdict of $350,000 as being insufficient. Following perfection of the appeal, Mr. Young negotiated a settlement involving a substantial increase in damages.
Griffith v. Southbridge Towers, Inc. et al, 248 App.Div.2d 162, 670 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; proximate cause; summary judgment]
Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to extract his hand truck from a depression in the pavement located on a city street. The street was being excavated in connection with work performed by defendant contractors. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was successful on appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants, holding that plaintiff’s actions in attempting to remove his hand truck did not constitute an intervening cause as a matter of law and that a jury could find that plaintiff’s action -- extricating his hand truck -- was a foreseeable consequence of the hazard.
Iqbal v. Rubin, 238 App.Div.2d 378, 657 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2nd Dept.) [personal injury; intersection collision; new trial granted]
Plaintiff was injured when his automobile hit the side of defendant’s automobile in an intersection collision. Defendant’s approach was controlled by a stop sign. The firm was successful in obtaining a reversal of the jury verdict in favor of defendant. The Appellate Division held that the proof established that defendant proceeded into the intersection without yielding the right of way to plaintiff and that the jury’s finding that defendant was not negligent could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence.
Greene v. Toys “R’ Us, Inc., 292 App.Div.2d 568, 739 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2nd Dept.)
[personal injury; reversing summary judgment dismissing case]
In a suit on behalf of a child who was injured when she fell from a partially assembled climbing toy on display at Toys R' Us, Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to appeal the dismissal of her case based on defendant’s claim that the toy was not dangerous and the condition was open and obvious. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the case, holding that it was foreseeable to the store that a child would use the toy and climb out of the window of the toy, which was missing its slide.
Widawski v. United Beef Packers, Inc., 183 App.Div.2d 444, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; special employee & workers’ compensation immunity]
Mr. Young represented plaintiff, who was injured while he was working at a plant owned and operated by defendant but being used temporarily by plaintiff’s employer, Hebrew National. The injury occurred when one of defendant’s employees carelessly turned on a packaging machine that plaintiff was repairing. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff was a special employee of defendant and that therefore his claim was barred by workers’ compensation. Mr. Young won, and at the subsequent trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $300,005.
Ramirez v. New York City Housing Authority, 249 App.Div.2d 88, 671 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; res ipsa loquitur]
Plaintiff was injured when an incinerator chute hopper door slammed shut on her hand. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was successful in sustaining the jury’s liability verdict in favor of plaintiff. The Appellate Division held that the trial court’s instruction on res ipsa loquitur was appropriate even though plaintiff had control of the door and that there was sufficient evidence of actual notice to defendant of the hazard.
Restivo v. Weinreb, 113 App.Div.2d 879, 493 N.Y.S.2d 607 (2nd Dept.) [personal injury; owner’s liability; special employee and workers’ compensation immunity]
Plaintiff, an employee of a real estate management company, was injured when he fell down an elevator shaft while attempting to enter a service elevator, and sued the owner of the building. The owner claimed that plaintiff was a special employee and that the suit was therefore barred by Worker’s Compensation. Mr. Young convinced the Appellate Division that defendant was not a special employer as she exercised no control over plaintiff. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict that defendant was liable for plaintiff’s injuries was affirmed.
Quintana v. City of New York, 259 App.Div.2d 296, 686 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; employee affidavit; sanction]
Plaintiff, who was employed by a company hired to maintain buildings owned by the City, sued for personal injuries sustained when he slipped on a temporary step which had been placed in a stairway by the City’s building superintendent. The trial court dismissed the case based on its finding that plaintiff’s investigator had improperly obtained a statement from the superintendent and that the statement was later altered. Sanford F. Young, P.C. successfully appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding that it was not improper under the Lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility for plaintiff’s investigator to conduct an ex parte interview with a low-level employee of defendant. While the Appellate Division sustained the trial Court’s finding that the statement was fabricated, it held that precluding the use of the statement at trial was a more appropriate sanction than dismissal.
Katz v. City of New York, 231 App.Div.2d 448, 647 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; notice of hazard]
Plaintiff commenced an action against the City and its contractor for injuries sustained when she fell in a construction hazard. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was successful in defending against the City’s appeal from the jury verdict which found defendants negligent. The Appellate Division held that the defendants’ contract, the testimony, and the police accident report supported the jury’s finding and that since the City created the hazard, no prior notice was required.
Doomes v. Best Transit Corp., 236 App.Div.2d 333, 655 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st Dept.) [personal injury; change of venue]
Plaintiffs, residents of the Bronx, Kings County, and Long Island, were injured in upstate New York when the driver of the mini-van in which they were traveling lost control of the van, which left the roadway and rolled over. Plaintiffs commenced suits against the owner of the van and its driver. Ford Motor Company was brought in under product liability claims. Ford moved for a change of venue from the Bronx to Warren County on the grounds that numerous claimed non-party witnesses, including police and rescue personnel, would be inconvenienced by a trial in Bronx County. Supreme Court granted Ford’s motion. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was successful in persuading the Appellate Division that the trial Court improvidently exercised its discretion and the Appellate Division thus reversed and sent the case back to the Bronx for trial.
Garcia v. Kraniotakis, 232 App.Div.2d 369, 648 N.Y.S.2d 156 (2nd Dept.) [personal injury; discovery abuses]
The firm was retained to represent plaintiff in defendant’s appeal from an order denying her motion to vacate a prior order precluding her from testifying at trial. The Appellate Division held that preclusion was proper in view of defendant’s wilful and contumacious noncompliance with discovery orders.
Herring v. Hayes, 135 App.Div.2d 684, 522 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2nd Dept) [personal injury; proximate cause]
Sanford F. Young was retained to represent defendant-respondent in plaintiff’s appeal from a jury verdict on damages. While defendant stipulated that she was 75% negligent, the jury found that plaintiff’s increased jaw pain and surgery were attributable to a preexisting disease rather than the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed.
Martin v. JL Distributors, Inc., 274 App.Div.2d 420, 711 N.Y.S.2d 22 (2nd Dept.)
[personal injury; no-fault threshold]
Plaintiff was injured when an ice-cream truck driven by defendant struck a tree, causing a tree limb to fall on Plaintiff’s neck. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff failed to meet the threshold requirements to establish a serious injury under the no-fault law. The trial court denied that motion. Sanford F. Young, P.C. successfully defended defendant’s appeal. The Appellate Division held that defendant’s submissions, including x-rays taken on the day of the accident and MRI reports one year later, established issues of aggravation sufficient to take the case to trial.
Sotomayor v. New York City Housing Authority, 265 App.Div.2d 255, 696 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dept.) [personal injury, notice of hazard]
Plaintiff commenced an action for personal injuries when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice on the walkway of a building owned by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and apportioned plaintiff’s negligence at 49% and defendant’s at 51%. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to defend against the NYCHA’s appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that defendant, whose workers were engaged in snow removal throughout the day, had notice of the ice hazard.
Perlmutter v. Zaret, 121 App.Div.2d 374, 503 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2nd Dept.) [personal injury, summary judgment]
The trial Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that issues of fact existed as to defendants’ negligence and the degree of comparative negligence.
Real Estate/Mortgages/Landlord-Tenant
Cooper Square Realty, Inc. v. A.R.S. Management, Ltd., 181 App.Div.2d 551, 581 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1st Dept.) [broker’s fee; agreement to agree]
Plaintiff commenced an action to recover brokerage fees when the subject property was sold through the efforts of another broker. Sanford F. Young represented defendant. Affirming the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Appellate Division held that the contract under which defendant was appointed exclusive sales agent for defendant’s property for “a commission to be separately determined” was an unenforceable agreement to agree.
Campbell v. Smith, 309 App.Div.2d 581, 768 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1st Dept.) [vacating prior appellate decision on motion to reargue; notice of pendency; foreclosure action reinstated]
Plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action filed a notice of pendency which expired prior to judgment. After expiration, plaintiff commenced a second foreclosure action, filed a second notice of pendency, and moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial Court. Relying on Matter of Sakow, 97 N.Y.2d 436, 741 N.Y.S.2d 666, the Appellate Division initially reversed, holding that the expiration of a prior notice of pendency precluded the filing of a second notice. On reargument, Sanford F. Young, P.C. succeeded in persuading the Appellate Division to reverse itself and recall its initial decision. It thus affirmed the Supreme Court, holding that the recorded mortgage gave proper notice and that plaintiff could file a successive notice of pendency so as to enter the judgement.
In re VR Equities v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 118 App.Div.2d 459, 499 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1st Dept.) [rent stabilization]
Defendant granted a tenant’s rent overcharge, rolled back the rent, and ordered a refund. Supreme Court dismissed petitioner’s Article 78 proceeding and petitioner appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that respondent’s own records demonstrated that the complaining tenant was the first rent stabilized tenant and that his complaint should have been treated as a fair market rent proceeding. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that respondent’s setting of a new rent based on its assumption that the subject premises became subject to rent stabilization on July 1, 1974 was arbitrary and capricious.
Eale Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 115 App.Div.2d 635, 496 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2nd Dept.) [jurisdiction; lease agreements]
Following trial, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiff’s breach of lease claim for lack of jurisdiction. Sanford F. Young was retained to handle the appeal. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that pursuant to the subject agreements, the State was acting by and through an agent. Thus, the action was properly brought in the Court of Claims.
Employment Law
Adzick v. AGS Computers, Inc., 160 App.Div.2d 530, 554 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1st Dept.)
[at-will employment contract; tortious interference; misrepresentation]
Sanford F. Young, P.C. represented defendants, plaintiff’s former employer and several individual corporate officers, in her action to recover commissions. Plaintiff alleged breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and misrepresentation. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the tortious interference and misrepresentation claims was denied. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff was an at-will employee and dismissed those causes of action. The Appellate Division also held that plaintiff failed to allege that the individual defendants committed any tortious acts outside the scope of the agreement and that her claims of misrepresentation were based on speculative promises of continued employment.
AGS Computers, Inc., v. Ornstein and Cap Gemini America, Inc., 144 App.Div.2d 1044, 534 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1st Dept.) [employment agreement; restrictive covenant]
Defendant violated a restrictive covenant of his employment agreement with plaintiff when he left his job, became an employee of a competitor, and solicited and hired another employee of plaintiff. Defendant claimed that Plaintiff’s merger with its former subsidiary constituted an abandonment of the agreement. Representing plaintiff, the firm successfully obtained a one-year injunction prohibiting defendant from violating the restrictive covenant. On defendant’s appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed.
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Attorneys’ Fees/Indemnity/Insurance
Hooper Associates v. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 549 N.Y.S.2d 365 [attorneys’ fees under indemnity clause; computer law]
In a landmark case, Mr. Young represented defendant against plaintiff’s claims of breach and contract and fraud in connection with the implementation of a computer system. Following trial, the jury returned a liability verdict in favor of plaintiff; however, the jury awarded plaintiff zero damages. Plaintiff then sought to recover its attorneys’ fees based on an indemnity provision of the contract. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the attorneys’ fees claim. The trial Court denied the motion and, upon a search of the record, granted summary judgment to plaintiff and the Appellate Division affirmed. Mr. Young was successful in the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which, reversing both lower courts, held that the contract provided for indemnity only with respect to third-party claims against plaintiff and not to actions between the parties. Hooper has been cited as an authority in hundreds of decisions, secondary sources and briefs.
United States Fire Insurance Company v. Altech Yachts, Inc., et al, 1991 WL 238246 (S.D.N.Y.) [insurance coverage; summary judgment]
Defendant boat dealer sought to recover under a “Dealer Policy” issued by Plaintiff U.S. Fire and a “Marine Cargo Policy” issued by third-party defendant Travelers Indemnity Company when the yacht he purchased from a manufacturer in Taiwan caught fire while it sat on a flat-bed trailer truck awaiting overland delivery to the ultimate purchasers. Plaintiff U.S. Fire disclaimed on the grounds that the yacht did not originate from defendant’s place of business and that it was not actually in transit when the fire occurred. Travelers likewise disclaimed on the grounds that the fire occurred more than seven days from the time the boat landed. Both carriers sought summary judgment. Mr. Young won against both carriers, obtaining summary judgment holding that both were liable to defendant.
In re New York State Urban Development Corporation v. Stareshefsky, 215 App.Div.2d 310, 626 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1st Dept.) [attorneys’ fees; condemnation]
Sanford F. Young, P.C. represented condemnees in their appeal from an award of attorneys’ fees to their former attorney. The Appellate Division substantially reduced the amount of the award.
In re Scifo, 272 App.Div.2d 335, 714 N.Y.S.2d 680 (2nd Dept. 2000) [attorneys’ fees; sanctions]
Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained by respondent to handle an appeal from the Surrogate’s dismissal of plaintiff’s petition alleging wrongful ejectment. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal on the grounds of plaintiff’s frivolous and vexatious litigation and also affirmed the Surrogate’s order which determined the amount of respondent’s attorneys’ fees.
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Domestic Relations
Lowinger v. Lowinger, 303 App.Div.2d 723, 757 N.Y.S.2d 323 (2nd Dept.) [domestic relations and judicial estoppel; new trial granted]
In a highly publicized divorce action, which had been the subject of major articles in various periodicals, including New York Magazine, plaintiff-wife's alimony suit was dismissed on the grounds that the underlying basis of her claim was precluded under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, based upon a prior decision against her in a suit she brought against her former mother-in-law. Sanford F. Young, P.C. was retained to handle the appeal, and succeeded in reversing and having her alimony claim reinstated for trial. The Appellate Division reasoned that plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims in the prior suit did not judicially estop her from establishing that her husband had income and imputed income from which he should be obligated to pay her maintenance.
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Civil Rights
Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.) [malicious prosecution; claim reinstated]
This was a Section 1983 Civil Rights suit for damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution by a former prisoner whose conviction was reversed and dismissed after he had spent two years in jail. The firm was retained to appeal from the United States District Court's order granting summary judgment to the City. On appeal, Mr. Young succeeded in winning a reversal in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals and having the case reinstated. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that there were issues of fact as to whether the City had probable cause for its prosecution. The Court reasoned that a jury could find that the indictment was secured through bad faith or perjury and that there was a malicious prosecution.
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